That is, they think all of their decisions were preordained, and then use this to claim that they can’t be held responsible for anything they do.
You punch them in the face, and then tell them they can’t be mad about it, because it’s not your fault, it was preordained.
Punch them in the mouth, it’s not like you have a choice.
What’s the best response? The best response is to laugh in their face and go find someone else to talk to.
The person you described is an idiot. Can you tell whether a person actually has free will by observing their actions? Like just by looking at them, can you predict exactly everything that they’re going to do?
(This is actually almost identical a famous problem in philosophy called the “philosophical zombie.”)
If the answer is “no”, and it is, then it doesn’t make sense to base your actions based on whether you have free will, because it doesn’t actually have any effect in your daily life, other than to irritate other people with your pseudo intellectual babble.
I’m a fairly hardcore/radical determinist, and tend to agree that individuals shouldn’t be held morally responsible for actions, any more than a hammer is morally responsible for driving a nail. However, that does not mean people should be free from consequence. There are plenty of reasons - even as a hardcore determinist - to hold people to account for their actions, either as a social corrective mechanism, public safety, deterrent, or personal sanity.
As for getting their actions to align with your morals, that’s a more complicated question that depends on the type of person they are.
How does a hardcore determinist believe in “shouldn’t?” Doesn’t that imply that people have the ability to change their behavior?
Doesn’t that imply that people have the ability to change their behavior?
My answer changes depending on your meaning but:
Of course. My brain is constantly updating and improving itself. I’m just not ultimately in control of how that process happens. Though that does not mean that I should stop living. I can still experience and enjoy my life, and ‘choose’ to improve it. It’s just that the I that made that choice is a consequence of my brain calculating optimal paths based on a myriad of factors: genetics, culture, circumstance, biological drives, personal history, drugs, etc.
To clarify: are you saying that there is a “you” who is a separate entity from your brain (and the rest of your body?)
Do you see it as your fingers are typing a reply and you’re just watching them do it on their own? You wouldn’t say that you’re the one typing?
I believe consciousness is a result of processes of the brain, and the brain is a very complex machine. It’s hard to say anything too concretely beyond that because I don’t really understand how it works. I live as though the brain and my consciousness are in perfect sync, but I’m unsure how true that is.
There are, for example, experiments where it can be shown that decisions are made before we are consciously aware that we have made them. Others show that severing a nerve between the hemispheres of our brain can result in two independent consciousnesses. Who can say where I end and my brain begins?
Your brain is you, though, just like your hands are you. Whether there’s a lag between the time that imaging detects you made a decision and you say you made one does not change the fact that you’re the one making the decision.
That’s one way of seeing things, and I respect that viewpoint, but I disagree. I primarily view myself as my consciousness; everything else is secondary. How do you know you aren’t a brain in a vat?
I’m a fallibilist: I don’t believe we can know anything for certain. The best we can do is base propositions off contingent statements: “If what I see is reliable, then what I see in the mirror is not a brain in a vat.”
A brain in a vat is not a very useful starting axioms, so I have no reason to give it serious consideration. By contrast, while taking the general accuracy of my own senses as axiomatic eventually leads me to conclude they can be fallible (example: hallucinations,) it is nonetheless a way more useful axiom for deriving a base of contingent knowledge.
